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william michael treanor  
Original Understanding and the Whether, Why, and 
How of Judicial Review 
For more than one hundred years, legal scholars have endlessly and 
heatedly debated whether judicial review of federal legislation was part of the 
original understanding of the Constitution. The stakes of the debate are high. 
If judicial review was part of the original understanding, then there is a strong 
argument that the practice is grounded in the majority’s will, just as the 
Founders’ Constitution is. But if it is not—if, as Alexander Bickel1 and others 
have claimed, judicial review was a sleight-of-hand creation of Chief Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison2—then judicial review is either counter-
majoritarian or else must find its popular grounding somewhere other than in 
the ratification of the Constitution by “We the People.” 
Yet, despite the prominence and the significance of the academic debate 
about whether judicial review was part of the original understanding, the 
answer to the controversy is surprisingly clear: contrary to the Bickelian point 
of view, judicial review was not created in Marbury. While there is a strong 
argument that the Constitution’s text contemplates judicial review of federal 
legislation—and it seems clear that the Supremacy Clause assumes that the 
federal judiciary has the power to review state legislation—the critical evidence 
concerning the acceptance of judicial review involves judicial practice. In the 
years before Marbury, exercises of judicial review were surprisingly common 
and generated surprisingly little controversy in either the courts or the political 
arena. As I have written recently, there were thirty-one cases between 
ratification and Marbury in which state and federal courts invalidated statutes, 
 
1.  ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS (1962); see also Alexander Bickel, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Alexander_Bickel (last visited Dec. 21, 2006). 
2.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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a number far greater than previously realized.3 Similarly, Maeva Marcus has 
shown that, in the first Congresses, Congressmen repeatedly took the position 
that the courts would review statutes for constitutionality.4 While acceptance 
of judicial review was not universal, it is striking—given the prevalence of the 
view that judicial review was created in Marbury—that the power was exercised 
so frequently and that the opposition to the exercise of that power was so 
limited. 
Thus, the difficult questions about the origins of judicial review are not 
whether it was part of the original understanding, but why it won such general 
acceptance and how the power was to be exercised. Professor Mary Bilder’s 
superb article, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,5 explicitly highlights 
these questions and will unquestionably stand as a landmark contribution to 
the literature of judicial review because of its contributions to these two areas. 
The why debate is one that has perplexed historians; Professor Bilder casts 
important new light on the issue by focusing on a body of practice—corporate 
law and, more specifically, Privy Council decisions—minimized by other 
scholars. The how debate—which, in asking how courts exercised judicial 
review, involves exploring the original scope of judicial review—is one that has 
more consequence for contemporary commentators because it addresses the 
question of when, according to the original understanding, courts should 
invalidate statutes. Professor Bilder’s claims with respect to the how question 
are perhaps too modest. Her thesis actually has consequences of fundamental 
importance because it buttresses a structuralist understanding of judicial 
review. 
As a matter of British constitutional theory, judicial review was not 
established at the time of the American Revolution. While there are a handful 
of seventeenth-century cases that some scholars have argued established the 
principle of judicial review,6 these cases can also be plausibly read as involving 
statutory interpretation and the judicial determination not to enforce 
problematic statutes in the absence of clear expressions of legislative purpose. 
Even if these cases are best understood as involving exercises of judicial review, 
it does not follow that judicial review was accepted at the time of the American 
Revolution. These cases preceded both the Glorious Revolution and the rise to 
dominance of the Blackstonian view of parliamentary supremacy. Rather than 
 
3.  William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005). 
4.  See Maeva Marcus, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING THE “EXTENDED 
REPUBLIC”: THE FEDERALIST ERA 25, 34–35, 48 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter J. Albert eds., 
1996). 
5.  Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006). 
6.  See, e.g., Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (C.P.). 
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reflecting the standard constitutional theory of 1776, they evidence an approach 
that had been long abandoned. 
If British constitutional theory in 1776 did not embrace judicial review, why 
did American courts come to exercise the power, and why did that exercise 
generate such little dispute? Professor Bilder argues that the answer lies in 
well-established principles of British corporate law. She traces to the thirteenth 
century the legal doctrine that corporations—including municipalities, which 
were corporate entities—possessed a limited, delegated authority and that 
exercises of this authority that exceeded that limited delegation were void. 
In the seventeenth century, this doctrine was naturally extended to those 
British colonies that possessed corporate charters. Because of similar 
circumstances, it was also extended to Crown grants to individual proprietors. 
Thus, the Privy Council during the colonial era used the doctrine of 
“repugnancy” established in the corporate context to invalidate colonial 
statutes and court decisions that were “repugnant” to the laws of England. 
Modern analysts readily recognize the theoretical differences between Privy 
Council review of colonial legislation for consistency with the imperial legal 
regime and the exercise of judicial review of legislative acts for their 
constitutionality. Professor Bilder argues, however, that the practice of review 
of legislation for repugnancy with a superior body of law was so well 
established that, after the American Revolution, courts came to assume almost 
reflexively the power that the Privy Council had once exercised. 
Professor Bilder thus places at the center of our understanding of the 
origins of judicial review imperial practices that I and others previously 
thought were of limited significance because of the vast conceptual difference 
between Privy Council review and judicial review. In arguing for the relevance 
of earlier forms of review, her critical move is to contend that perceived 
continuity of practice, rather than logic, led courts to embrace judicial review 
and that the same perceived continuity accounts for the absence of popular 
challenge to judicial assertions of this power. Judicial review looked like 
something Americans were familiar with. Only with the passage of time, as 
Americans started to work through the implications of the doctrine of 
separation of powers, did challenges to the legitimacy of judicial review 
emerge. But late-eighteenth-century Americans failed to grasp the problem. 
Because she finds the acceptance of judicial review to be reflexive, rather 
than based on a coherent theoretical understanding, Professor Bilder argues 
that her history casts little light on the question of when judicial review became 
standard practice. She writes, “The simultaneous ambiguity and certainty of 
the phrase ‘repugnant to the Constitution’ meant that judges did not initially 
have to confront whether they were engaged in what we would call narrow or 
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broad constructions of the Constitution. Early cases may—or may not—
support both expansive and restrictive approaches to review.”7 
I think Professor Bilder’s conclusion is too modest. Her explanation of the 
corporate origins of judicial review dovetails with my recent argument against 
the dominant scholarly view—espoused most prominently by Dean Larry 
Kramer8—that early exercises of judicial review were limited to statutes that 
were clearly unconstitutional. I argue, instead, that the thirty-one cases of 
judicial review prior to Marbury reflected a structural approach. 
In the pre-Marbury period, federal courts repeatedly invalidated statutes 
that affected the judicial role—such as by altering jurisdiction—or the role of 
juries, and they did so even when there were plausible constitutional 
arguments in favor of the statutes. Similarly, federal courts repeatedly 
invalidated state statutes that were arguably constitutional; in most cases, the 
invalidated statutes implicated national power. Finally, in two cases, state 
courts struck down state statutes for violating the Federal Constitution. These 
three categories account for all instances in which the federal courts invalidated 
a statute prior to Marbury. 
This early American case law reflects a boundary protection approach to 
judicial review. Courts in the founding era reviewed legislation that implicated 
the powers of those not involved in its adoption: juries, courts, and, in the case 
of state legislation, the national government. They did not engage in 
meaningful substantive review—rather, they were concerned with protecting 
the basic relationships of constitutional governance. Yet, despite the evidence 
of this strong pattern throughout a large body of case law, I did not find any 
writer from the period who recognized it or provided a theoretical justification 
for it. 
Professor Bilder’s work does not focus on the nature of the early judicial 
review cases in this country and thus she concludes that the early history of 
judicial review does not illuminate the question of when judicial review was 
exercised. Nonetheless, by placing the early cases in the context of British 
corporate law and Privy Council decisions, her article is more important than 
she recognizes in illuminating why judicial review was structuralist and why 
the advocates of judicial review did not offer a theoretical explanation for their 
approach. 
Privy Council review was, at its core, concerned with boundaries: the 
imperial government’s purpose in conducting such review was to ensure that 
 
7.  Bilder, supra note 5, at 512. 
8.  LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 92, 99, 102-03 (2004); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term: Foreword: 
We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 79 (2001). 
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colonial governments did not overstep their bounds. Judicial review in the 
early republic involved a similar function: ensuring that legislators did not 
legislate in ways that undercut the power of other government entities. 
Whereas Professor Bilder finds that the “repugnancy” standard applied by the 
courts of this country as they exercised judicial review was so open-ended as to 
make the “when” question unanswerable, the historical practice actually fits a 
definite pattern analogous to the conception of repugnancy review employed 
by the Privy Council. 
As I conducted my research, one question I asked myself is why early 
writers on judicial review did not explain or justify the structural approach to 
judicial review so evident in the case law. Professor Bilder’s approach suggests 
an answer: early Americans perceived judicial review by the federal courts as 
the application of a pre-existing practice of review for boundary protection in a 
new context. They therefore did not apprehend a need to offer an elaborate 
justification for a practice to which they were accustomed. In short, Professor 
Bilder’s work significantly clarifies why judicial review won such easy 
acceptance, and—to an extent that even she fails to appreciate—helps explain 
why judicial review was exercised in some cases and not others. 
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